Unlike the managerially oniented reforms that have brought auditing and accounting into such prominence in the UK National Health Service (NHS), and which seem alien to the culture of the caring professions, consumerist reforms may seem to complement moves towards the acceptance of wide definitions of health, and towards increasing patient autonomy. The empowerment favoured by those who support patient autonomy sounds like the sort ofempowerment that is sometimes associated with the patient's charter. For this reason moral criticism of recent NHS reforms may stop short of calling consumerism into question. This, however, would be a mistake: consumerism can be objectionable both within and beyond the health care market.
down prices and raises the quality and supply of treatment. Prices are also supposed to be driven down by freeing up the labour-market in health care, allowing savings to be made according to regional variations in the cost of living and rates of unemployment. For the system to work as intended, the costs of labour and capital and the effectiveness of treatment need to be monitored in great detail, and measures of performance have to be agreed and widely adopted. Many of the moral problems with the internal market arise from what is involved in monitoring cost and measuring performance, rather than from something morally questionable in the policy of getting value for money itself. It is not as if getting value for money is economically important as opposed to morally important. It is both. The NHS discharges an urgent moral obligation to relieve pain and treat disease and to promote fully functioning human life: the more treatment can be provided from fixed or shrinking budgets, the more pain and disease can be treated and full functioning promoted, at least in principle. If the reformed NHS, with its internal market, is more efficient than the NHS with government-imposed cash limits that operated in the early 1980s, then that is an argument -a moral argument as well as an economic argument -for the reformed NHS.
Yet the morally important goal of making budgets stretch further may itself have moral costs. The NHS relies on the skills and commitment of a vast number of health care professionals and allied workers. Maintaining their commitment and morale is expensive, and the main factor pushing this cost upwards is rarely simple selfishness. When the poor pay of some NHS employees is kept low because public spending targets require it, that is a sign that people whose work is morally valuable are themselves the victims of a failure of distributive justice. The more the relief of pain and suffering costs, however, the less relief can be provided within limited budgets. Or at least, the less can be provided unless waste is rife. It is unlikely to be clear whether waste is rife unless the costs of providing health carLare established, and unless the health care provided is known to be effective. But A health insurance policy that cut premiums to the nonclaiming twenty-year-old until they were very low indeed, and then kept them at that level until there was a claim, could not sustain the big payouts that would be required when the policy-holder who had never yet claimed reached an age associated with expensive illnesses. But commercial health insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect relatively low-risk lifestyles and occupations. From the angle of the private health insurance market, low-risk people who pay the same as high-risk people into the NHS pool are not getting their due as customers (a premium that rewards low-risk policy-holders), while those who never pay and always use the NHS (sometimes because they smoke and drink far more than doctors advise) are getting a free ride at the expense of paying non-users. From the angle of the commercial market, it is the free riders who should be paying, or perhaps who should be excluded from insurance altogether, since they do nothing to lower their health risks.
Principle of solidarity
If one finds this way ofthinking repellent, because one subscribes to the principle of providing treatment according to need and not according to means, then one has also got to consider whether insurance consumerism, which generates this way of thinking, is really at home in the NHS context, even though payments for the NHS go into an insurance pool. It maybe that in the NHS, as opposed to the commercial health insurance funds, a principle of solidarity between paying non-users and non-paying users and everybody in between has to be introduced. It Health and wealth I have been arguing that consumerism tends to misrepresent the NHS and the position of users within it. Patients are certainly not the only ones with rights, and they have responsibilities to others in the NHS, not only to the doctors, but also to the paying non-users or the paying light users. The paying nonusers and the paying light users, for their part, are not necessarily being taken advantage of by the others, since the good they are subsidising for the heavy users is one that the people cannot do without. This is why solidarity is in order. It may be a kind of bad luck that one is in a position to be a heavy payer at a time institutions exist to exact the payment from you. But it is not bad luck to be in the position of being a heavy payer, or for one's resources to be used to relieve the need for so basic a good. For in order to be a heavy payer, one normally needs health and wealth, and one's wealth is normally far from exhausted when one subsidises other people's health care through an insurance pool. From the perspective of solidarity, the heavy non-users are lucky to be at such low risk and have a greater ability, as a result, to gain the income from which their contributions are drawn. From a consumerist angle, on the other hand, the heavy-paying non-claimants in an insurance pool are heavily exploited: they are being charged too much for protection against a small risk of ever having draw upon the pool themselves.
It might be objected that I have been too hard on consumerism, since in the NHS context the effect of it, or at least the intended effect, is the morally creditable one of getting providers to think more and more about the wishes of patients, and less and less about making life easier for themselves. It might be thought that far from needing criticism, consumerism actually promotes treatment that shows patients more respect in the moralist's sense of "respect". Again, when the consumer is not the individual patient but the GP practice or the health authority, the consumerism of the reformed NHS can have the effect of producing a greater amount of synergy between providers and purchasers of a service, with likely therapeutic benefits for patients. Surely this, too, must constitute a moral improvement over the old NHS?
I concede that the purchaser/provider split may bring about more coordination among GPs, hospitals and health authorities through the discipline of financial penalties for those who are careless of purchaser choice, but I doubt that consumerism is the right medium for increasing respect for patients in the sense of "respect" that is familiar in moral theory. The standard basis in moral theory for moral respect -namely the humanity or personhood of the patient -is independent of, and logically prior to, any role a patient has as user or consumer of a service. Moreover, treating someone primarily as a user or purchaser of a service need not reinforce respect for persons, since it might emphasise the economic value that a patient offers -the increase in practice size and income -rather than the The conference aims: (1) to provide an intimate forum for an exchange of viewpoints about the role of values in psychiatric classification; (2) to improve the quality of future diagnostic classifications through an enhanced awareness of value issues; and (3) to make concrete and specific suggestions to psychiatric nosologists about how value-related nosological problems can be addressed in future editions of the DSM or ICD. A selection of the conference papers and discussion will be published in book form.
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